



# Piccolo: An Ultra-Lightweight Blockcipher



**Kyoji Shibutani, Takanori Isobe, Harunaga Hiwatari,  
Atsushi Mitsuda, Toru Akishita and Taizo Shirai  
Sony Corporation**

# Motivation for New Design

- **Cryptography is required everywhere**
  - RFID, sensor nodes, IoT, low resource devices,..
  - Strong demands for lightweight cryptography



**Personal**



**Pervasive**

- **Our Target**

 **Blockcipher**

Bulk encryption, MAC, entity authentication protocol,...

# Piccolo is

- Feistel-type lightweight blockcipher that achieves:
  - **High security**
    - Secure against known attacks including MITM and RKA
  - **Compact implementation**
    - Less than 700 GE  $\Rightarrow$  low power consumption
    - Low required GE keeping high throughput  
 $\Rightarrow$  low energy consumption
- **“General purpose”** lightweight blockcipher
  - Not limited to applications
  - Decryption can be supported without much cost
    - Because of involution structure
  - Suitable for both flexible key and fixed key setting
    - Because of permutation based key scheduling




# Specification

# The Blockcipher Piccolo

## Basic Information


- **Block Size** : 64-bit
- **Key Size** : 80-bit, 128-bit  
(referred as **Piccolo-80/128**)
- **Structure** : variant of 4-line type-II  
generalized Feistel network
- **# Rounds** : 25 (80-bit key), 31 (128-bit key)

# The Blockcipher Piccolo




# Round function ( $F$ and $RP$ )


## Round function



## $F$ (F-function)




## $RP$ (round permutation)



# What's new in round function


## ■ Compact 4-bit S-box

- only 4 NORs, 3 XORs and 1 XNOR (about 12 GE)
- sandwich construction makes F-function strong



## ■ Byte permutation “*RP*”


- provides fast diffusion without HW implementation cost
  - enhance security against impossible diff., saturation, MITM, ...






# Key scheduling function (KSF)

KSF consisting of selectors



GOST, KTANTAN, LED, Piccolo, ...

KSF requiring key register



PRESENT, KATAN, ...

## ■ MUX based KSF

- Key register is not necessary
- Suitable for both fixed and flexible key settings
- Carefully chose the permutation to have enough immunity against RKA and MITM



# Security analysis


# Security analysis

- Active F-functions based evaluation
  - Differential attack
  - Linear attack
  - Boomerang-type attacks
  - Related key differential-type attacks
    - Related key boomerang/rectangle attacks
    - Related key impossible differential attack
- Diffusion property based evaluation
  - Impossible differential attack
  - Saturation attack
  - Meet-in-the-middle attack
- Others
  - Higher-order differential attack
  - Algebraic attack


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# Active F-function




differentially active F-function



linearly active F-function

- Each differentially/linearly active F-function reduces differential/linear probability
- $\Rightarrow$  minimum number of active F-function implies the security against differential and linear type attacks
- Counted the number of active F-functions by exhaustively searching all possible differential/linear trails

# # active F-functions of Piccolo



**7R**  
**(8R for linear)**

**14R**

**16R**

MDP of F =  $2^{-9.299}$  (7 active F-functions needed)


MLP of F =  $2^{-8.0}$  (8 active F-functions needed)



# Implementation aspects

# Optimization for F-function in 4-bit serialized architecture


- Feistel-type requires intermediate registers for F-function






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
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
# Optimization for F-function in 4-bit serialized architecture

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- intermediate registers can be reduced by adding  $S^{-1}$  function




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
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
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
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
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- intermediate registers can be reduced by adding  $S^{-1}$  function
- $S^{-1}$  of Piccolo is small  $\Rightarrow$  required gate is reduced





# Countermeasure against SCA

- Threshold implementations [ICICS06]
  - provably secure countermeasure against 1st order SCA
  - at least 3 shares are necessary  
(required gates depend on # shares, and 3 is the smallest)



- S-box of Piccolo
  - belongs to the alternating group  $A_{16}$   
 $\Rightarrow$  can be decomposed using quadratic bijections [CHES10]
  - Thus, Piccolo S-box requires **only 3 shares** when applying threshold implementation

# Hardware performance (summary)

		serialized arch.		round-based arch.	
algorithm		Piccolo-80	Piccolo-128	Piccolo-80	Piccolo-128
cycles/block		432	528	27	33
<b>fixed key</b>	area	<b>616</b>	<b>654</b>	1051	1083
	FOM			<b>2145</b>	<b>1653</b>
<b>flexible key</b>	area	1043	1334	1496	1773
	FOM			1059	616
<b>fixed key</b>	area	676	714	1189	1284
<b>flexible key</b>	area	1103	1394	1634	1938

including decryption function

**Adding decryption functions is almost free!**

\* FOM = (nanobit per cycles) / area squared [GE<sup>2</sup>]



\*\* 0.13 um standard cell library

\*\*\* 1 GE = 2-way NAND



# Efficiency comparison

• **Piccolo is smallest in fixed key setting !**

**Target:  
same block size  
same key size**



• **Piccolo is very small and high FOM in flexible key setting !**



# Conclusion

- Proposed an ultra-lightweight blockcipher “Piccolo”
  - Security
    - secure against known attack including MITM and RKA
  - Performance
    - one of the most compact ciphers
    - achieved the best performance w.r.t. energy consumption
- Further analysis is very welcome!



**Thank you for your attention!**